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A new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs)  of large com- 
mercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the 
elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For con- 
tinuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, 
as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay 
to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not 
filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability 
of  CEO  departure to  age and performance, as measured by stock 
returns filtered for peer-group returns;  CEO experience does not in- 
fluence this relationship. 
The relation of chief executive officer (CEO)  pay and turnover to perfor- 
mance and characteristics  of companies has been the focus of a number of 
theoretical and empirical studies. This study extends this analysis to a new 
data set that covers large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. 
We begin with  a simple theory, motivated by Rosen's (1982)  model, 
that generates positive matching between CEO skill, and hence compen- 
sation, and the size of banks. We then extend the analysis to consider how 
compensation evolves over time in response to observations on perfor- 
mance. We assume in the main discussion that changes in pay correspond 
to changes in expected marginal product. One proposition that emerges 
from this analysis is that the sensitivity of changes in pay to performance 
diminishes as CEO experience increases. 
We are grateful  for comments  from Gary  Chamberlain,  Robert  Gibbons,  Jim 
Medoff,  Jim Poterba,  Sherwin  Rosen,  and Laura  Stiglin. 
[Journal  of Labor  Economics, 1990, vol. 8, no. 4] 
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Our  empirical  study  begins  with the relation  between  the levels  of com- 
pensation  and  bank  assets  for newly hired  CEOs.  Then  we study  how the 
compensation  of continuing  CEOs  responds  to performance  based  on stock 
returns  and  accounting  earnings.  We examine  how CEO experience  affects 
the sensitivity  of pay to performance  and whether  actual  or relative  per- 
formance  matters. 
In the next section we explore  how the correlation  between  the levels 
of compensation  and assets  varies  with CEO experience.  The variations 
in this correlation  depend  on the growth  of compensation,  considered  in 
the previous  section, and also on the growth of assets.  In addition,  the 
correlation  would be affected  by CEO turnover  if there is a systematic 
tendency  to terminate  CEOs who perform  the poorest. 
The final  section  uses  logit regressions  to relate  the probability  of CEO 
turnover  to age and performance.  We consider  the effects  from market- 
and accounting-based  returns,  the distinction  between  actual  and relative 
performance,  and  the effects  of experience.  The  results  for  turnover  provide 
a number  of interesting  comparisons  with those  for compensation  growth. 
A Model of Bank Size, CEO Compensation, and Performance 
We begin with a simple theoretical  model that allows for matching 
between  the size of a bank  and the quality  (and hence compensation)  of 
the CEO. The production  function  for bank  i is 
yi = XiF(ki, Ai),  (1) 
where  Xi  is a technological  or resource  factor  for the bank,  ki is the antic- 
ipated  skill level of the CEO, and  Ai represents  bank  assets  or, more  gen- 
erally,  an array  of inputs that includes  labor.  In Rosen's (1982) model, 
CEO skill involves  the quality  of decisions  ("general  atmosphere")  and 
the ability  to supervise.  The units are defined  so that a CEO with twice 
as much  supervisory  talent  can  administer  twice as many  people  at a given 
level of effectiveness.  For a given quality  of decision  making,  it is natural 
to assume  constant  returns  to scale  in the  other  inputs,  including  supervisory 
talent.  Because  F( *  ) exhibits  constant  returns  to inputs  aside  from  decision- 
making  ability,  it must  show increasing  returns  with respect  to all inputs. 
The bank's  net revenue  is 
Xin  F(ki, Ai) -  v(ki) -  rAi,  (2) 
where  r, the constant  cost for assets,  represents  payments  to depositors  or 
the opportunity  cost for equity.  The bank  faces  the CEO wage function, 
v(ki) with v'>  0, that  relates  CEO compensation,  vi, to the level  of skill, 
ki. The function  v(ki) is determined  in the overall  population,  as in Rosen 
( 1982),  by the  distribution  of the supply  of CEO talent  and  by the demand 450  Barro/Barro 
for CEO skill (from banks and also from other companies if CEO talent 
is substitutable across fields). 
The bank chooses ki and Ai (and other inputs) to maximize its net rev- 
enue. The second-order conditions for this maximization require v" >  0; 
that is, at least in the neighborhood of the selected ki, CEO pay must rise 
at an increasing rate with the level of skill. Since the function v(k)  must 
satisfy this condition in a full equilibrium, we assume that v" >  0 applies. 
The conditions for maximization of net revenue determine Ai and ki- 
and therefore vi = v(ki) -as  functions of Xi  and r. For given r, an increase 
in Xi implies increases in Ai, ki, and vi; that is, better institutions (higher 
Xi)  are larger  in the sense that they assemble more assets, hire a better CEO 
(higher ki), and pay the CEO more (higher vi). 
An increase in Xi lowers the ratio of CEO skill to size, ki/Ai,  because 
an increase in ki raises the marginal cost of CEO talent, v'(ki),  relative to 
the constant marginal cost, r, of assets. The behavior of the ratio of CEO 
pay to assets, vi/Ai,  is unclear because vi/ki  tends to rise with ki. Typical 
empirical results indicate that the elasticity of CEO pay with respect to a 
size variable, such as bank assets, is positive, less than one, and roughly 
constant at about one-third. This finding means that the ratio vi/Ai declines 
as Xi  increases;  a result that is possible but not inevitable within the model. 
The analysis treated ki and Ai as freely adjustable  inputs. This treatment 
of ki seems most appropriate at the time a CEO is installed.' Therefore, 
our initial empirical analysis deals with the relation between compensation 
and bank assets during a CEO's initial year in office. However, the variable 
vi should be interpreted as the expected present value of compensation 
attached to becoming the CEO of bank i. We consider below the relation 
of this present value to the compensation in the initial year in office, which 
we denote by wiI. 
There are adjustment  costs associated with changes in assets  Ai (or num- 
bers of employees and other inputs). In fact, variations in Ai across firms 
for historical reasons, rather than because of differences in current tech- 
nological parameters Xi, can also be viewed as generating cross-sectional 
dispersion in ki and vi. That is, bigger banks tend to hire better CEOs 
even  if these banks do  not  currently have access to  better production 
functions. 
We consider now the change in compensation over time, assuming that 
the CEO  remains in office. Later we  allow  for CEO  turnover and for 
' This freedom  of choice  may  be limited  if, as is usually  the case,  the promotion 
to CEO comes from within the company  rather  than as an appointment  from 
outside.  (In our sample,  46 of the 60 newly installed  CEOs, or 76%,  had more 
than 1  year  of prior  tenure  on the corporate  board.)  Lazear  and  Rosen  ( 1981  ) argue 
that the selection  as CEO should be viewed as the final match  of an extended 
tournament  involving  insiders. Bank  CEOs  451 
growth in bank assets. In determining the growth of compensation, we 
assume that the bank's directors-acting  in the interest of the bank's own- 
ers-use  information revealed by two kinds of variables: measures of the 
bank's performance for year t,  PERFit, and corresponding measures of 
performance  for a peer group of banks,  denoted by PERF>*.  In the empirical 
analysis, PERF* is the average  of PERF  - for year t and for the geographical 
region where bank i is located. 
We begin with the hypothesis that the growth of compensation, log(wit/ 
wit_,), corresponds  to the growth of the CEO's expected marginal  product. 
Thus, the change in pay considers new information about the CEO's skill 
level, ki, and also allows for shifts in production conditions (F(.)  in eq. 
[1  ]) or factor supplies (v( *  ) or r in eq. [2 ]).  This analysis abstracts from 
explicit or implicit labor contracts that allow for significant departures  of 
the  growth  in  compensation  from  the  growth  in  expected  marginal 
product.2 
The main information about CEO talent comes from the observation 
of relative  performance,  PERFit = PERFj,  -  PERF  (see Holmstrom 1982). 
Consider the model 
PERFit  = a +  Pki +  i,  t =  1, 2,...,  (3) 
where a and 13  are known constants and sit has zero mean and constant 
variance  a2. The formulation assumes that the skill level of the average 
CEO is a known constant; in particular, it is unnecessary to learn about 
this average value. The expected value of ki conditioned on data through 
T years in office, denoted by E(ki)  T,  depends on the sample mean of the 
PERFit  and on the prior information about ki that was used in the initial 
hiring decision. Suppose that this prior information is equivalent in terms 
of information content to To observations on PERFit, where To need not 
be an integer. Then it is straightforward  to show that the relation between 
E(ki) ITand PERFit  involves the coefficient 1  /( To  +  T). Therefore,  a higher 
level of experience, T, implies a smaller sensitivity of E(ki)  I  T to PERFit.3 
For given ki, the CEO's value of marginal product varies with distur- 
bances that are industry- or region- or economywide.  We assume that 
these  elements  are  captured  by  the  aggregate  performance  variable, 
2 Becker  and  Stigler  (1975), Lazear  (1979), and  others  argue  that  deferred  com- 
pensation  has  desirable  incentive  effects  on workers.  This  pattern  requires  significant 
departures  of wages  from  expected  marginal  products. 
3 See  Murphy  (1986) for a similar  result.  The analysis  is more  complicated  if the 
CEO's  skill changes  over  time. Holmstrom  (1983, sec. 1.2) assumes  that  the skill 
level,  kit,  evolves  as a random  walk.  The sensitivity  of E(ki,) I  T to performance  still 
diminishes  with T, but  this  sensitivity  now approaches  an asymptote  that  is positive 
rather  than  zero. 452  Barro/Barro 
PERF  *. Therefore, if variations in compensation correspond to variations 
in expected marginal product, the changes in compensation depend on 
PERF  *  as well as PERFit. Denoting  compensation for year t by wit and 
assuming a linear functional form, the growth of compensation is given 
by 
PERFit 
log(wit/wit,)  = a + b  +  + c  PERF,  t  2, 3, ....  (4) 
(To +  T)it 
The constant term a reflects growth in value of marginal  product associated 
with greater experience of the CEO or with industry- or region- or econ- 
omywide productivity growth. 
The specification in equation (4)  implies that CEOs  assume compen- 
sation risk associated with  uncertainty about aggregate effects, PERF*, 
and relative performance, PERFit.  The bank could insure the CEO against 
aggregate risk by setting compensation independently of PERF*. In this 
case,the  growth in compensation in equation (4) would depend only on 
relative performance, PERFit  (see Holmstrom  1979). 
One attraction of relative-performance  agreements is that the aggregate 
variable PERFj* cannot be manipulated significantly by a single CEO. 
Nevertheless, these kinds of contracts create problems associated with the 
presence of gaps between wages and expected marginal products: (1) if a 
favorable  realization  of PERFI results in an excess of the expected marginal 
product over the wage, the CEO can quit; (2) if an unfavorable realization 
of PERFj*t  creates  an excess of the wage over the expected marginal  product, 
the bank can effectively renege by treating the CEO badly; and (3)  insu- 
lation of wit from aggregate variables gives the CEO insufficient incentive 
to take actions that mitigate the effects of aggregate disturbances on an 
individual bank's performance (see Jensen and Murphy 1988, p. 17). The 
benefit from insulating compensation growth from aggregate  performance 
is also likely to be small. If the CEO cares a great deal about aggregate 
risk, then he can insure himself by taking the appropriate position in the 
stock market (e.g., by going short on a portfolio of bank stocks).  Because 
the benefits are small and the costs are likely to be significant, we do not 
anticipate that CEO contracts would be sheltered from aggregate perfor- 
mance. In any event, the effect of PERF  *t in equation (4) is a test for the 
prevalence of contracts that reduce or eliminate the sensitivity of CEO 
pay to aggregate factors. 
Risks associated with relative performance, PERFit, in equation (4) are 
harder  to reduce without compromising incentives for good CEO behavior. 
Moreover, if the CEO has superior information about skill or effort, k1, 
then the CEO's risk associated with PERFLt  may not be great. 
For a CEO in the initial year, the level of assets,A1,  relates  to the expected Bank  CEOs  453 
present value of compensation, vi. Hence vi corresponds to the expected 
present value of the wit-that  is, the sum of initial salary, wil,  and the 
anticipated discounted values of  future salaries, wi2,  wi3,  ...,  that are 
determined from equation (4).  Since PERFi, reflects news, the date 1 ex- 
pectations of PERFit  and PERF* are zero; hence, E[log(wit/wit-01  -  a. 
Therefore,  for  given  parameters of  the  distributions  of  PERFit and 
PERF  *  vi differs from wi I only by a multiplicative constant. Accordingly, 
the empirical work uses wi -executive  pay in the first year on the job- 
as a counterpart of vi. 
Setup of the Empirical Analysis 
The empirical work uses a new panel data set on CEO compensation 
for large U.S. commercial banks over the period 1982-87. From the stand- 
point of testing theories about executive compensation, the banking in- 
dustry is attractive because of the presence of a large number of firms that 
produce a similar product. The sample of 83 banks is a subset of the 140 
banks that ranked highest in assets in 1986. Attrition of the sample occurred 
because of unavailable data, sometimes because banks disappeared as in- 
dependent entities or were foreign owned (and therefore did not file dis- 
closure statements with the Securities  and Exchange Commission [SEC]).4 
These considerations mean that some banks appear  in the sample for some 
years but not others. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample by year 
and geographical region. 
The data are from individual proxy statements, Compuserve,  Business 
Week's  annual listing of the top 200 banks, and Standard  and Poors' com- 
pany reports. The information includes for each bank and year the total 
of salary and bonus of the highest-paid executive (usually designated as 
CEO),  assets, accounting earnings and earnings per share, share prices, 
dividend yields, age of the CEO, and number of years of prior experience 
as CEO. The data set also includes the geographical location of the bank. 
Real assets are the ratio of the nominal, year-end values to the seasonally 
adjusted December consumer price index (CPI).  Real compensation and 
earnings are the ratios of the nominal figures to the annual average of the 
CPI. Real returns  to shareholders  are the real dividend yield plus the growth 
rate of nominal share prices (year-end to year-end) less the inflation rate 
(December-December  CPI).  Appendix  table Al  shows  the means and 
standard  deviations of the variables that we use in the subsequent analysis. 
In a preliminary study of a dozen banks, the compensation figures were 
4 In the case of a merger,  the important  consideration  for our purpose  is not 
whether  the bank  remains  as the same  entity over time but whether  the CEO is 
continuing  or new. If the CEO after  the merger  is the same  person  who was CEO 
of one of the original  banks,  we treated  the CEO as continuing  with past-perfor- 
mance  characteristics  corresponding  to those of the old bank. 454  Barro/Barro 
Table 1 
Composition of Sample by Year and Region 
1987  1986  1985  1984  1983  1982  Total 
New  CEO sample: 
New  England  2  0  1  1  0  1  5 
New  York City  2  0  1  2  0  2  7 
Mid-Atlantic  1  1  1  3  2  3  11 
Midwest  1  2  4  2  4  4  17 
South  1  2  3  1  2  2  11 
Texas/Oklahoma  1  1  0  1  0  0  3 
West  2  1  0  1  1  1  6 
Total  10  7  10  11  9  13  60 
Continuing sample: 
New  England  5  6  5  5  5  ...  26 
New  York City  6  9  8  7  9  ...  39 
Mid-Atlantic  8  11  12  10  10  ...  51 
Midwest  19  16  14  17  15  ...  81 
South  16  16  16  16  14  ...  78 
Texas/Oklahoma  1  3  5  4  5  ...  18 
West  7  7  8  8  7  ...  37 
Total  62  68  68  67  65  330 
NOTE.-Mid-Atlantic  includes  the District  of Columbia,  Maryland,  New York  (outside  of New York 
City),  New Jersey,  and  Pennsylvania.  Midwest  includes  Indiana,  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
Missouri,  Ohio, and  Wisconsin.  South  is the southeastern  states,  excluding  Texas.  West  includes  western 
and  mountain  states  and  Hawaii.  States  not mentioned  had  no banks  in the sample. 
expanded from salary and bonus to include the estimated value of stock 
options granted and some elements of deferred compensation. Because the 
information about stock options, including when they were granted, was 
often incomplete, it was not possible to value these options precisely or 
to assign them unambiguously to a particular  year. The expanded figures 
on compensation differed from salary and bonus by an amount that was 
volatile across years and banks. However, the general nature  of the relation 
between compensation and other variables did not depend very much on 
whether narrow or broad compensation was used. For this reason, the 
present study is limited to compensation in the form of salary and bonus. 
Results  for  the  Initial  Year in Office 
Over the period 1982-87  there are 60 observations on CEOs  in their 
first year of office. For these new CEOs, the regression of log(real com- 
pensation) on log(real assets) is 
log(wit)  =-3.84  +  .316  *  log(Ait), 
(0.30)  (.032)  (5) 
N=60,  R2 =  .623,  G=.267, Bank  CEOs  455 
where standard  errors  appear  in parentheses.  Thus the estimated coefficient 
of log(Ait) is positive and highly significant, with a t-value of 10. Equation 
(5)  can be interpreted from the theory in terms of the joint effect of the 
exogenous (unobservable) bank characteristic,  Xi, on CEO compensation 
and assets. Thus, in equilibrium, the responses imply that compensation 
moves with an elasticity of about one-third with respect to assets. 
The relation between executive pay and firm size shown in equation (5) 
is typical of findings from previous studies for various industries and time 
periods, although many researchers  use sales, rather than assets, as the size 
variable  (see Ciscel and Carroll [1980] for a survey). These empirical  results 
have spurred a good  deal of  theoretical analysis, going  back to  Simon 
(1957) and Beckmann (1960) and including more substantial  recent models 
by Rosen (1982) and Keren and Levhari (1983).  Although these theories 
can rationalize the positive relation between CEO pay and size, the puzzle 
is why the relation is so similar across industries and time and why  the 
estimated elasticity of pay with respect to size is usually close to one-third. 
Shifts in the CEO wage function, v(  )-which  might reflect changes 
in the aggregate demand for CEOs-could  shift the relation between com- 
pensation and assets. The regression in equation (5)  is, however, stable 
over time for the sample period 1982-87. Year dummies are jointly insig- 
nificant if added to the equation. 
Results  on Changes  in Compensation  for Continuing  CEOs 
Equation (4) brought in performance and applied to the change in pay 
over time for CEOs that remained in office. In the empirical analysis, the 
wage for year t represents partly base salary set at the beginning of the 
year and partly bonus set at the beginning of the next year. (The data set 
does not include a separation between base salary and bonus.) Performance 
for year t could affect this year's pay (especially through the bonus) and 
also next year's pay (especially through the base salary). 
Two measures of performance turned out to be important empirically: 
real rate of return to shareholders (based on stock-market prices and div- 
idend yields) and accounting-based real rate of return.  Even if shareholders 
care only about market returns, the accounting returns may provide in- 
dependent information about CEO ability or effort (see Holmstrom [1979], 
sec. 4,  for a general discussion).  Therefore, it is reasonable that both 
measures of performance matter for the change in compensation. 
The variable RSit  is the total real rate of return (real stock-price appre- 
ciation plus real dividend yield) to stockholders of bank i in year t. This 
variable shows little serial correlation: a regression for 1983-87 (410 ob- 
'The usual  descriptions  of CEO bonus  plans  also suggest  an important  role  for 
accounting earnings; see Fox (1979). 456  Barro/Barro 
servations) of RS., on RS.,-, yields the estimated coefficient .03, SE =  .06. 
(The mean of RS,. for this sample is .134.) Therefore, aside from a constant 
to measure the average real rate of return, the value of RS,. represents the 
news for year t  that should matter for the adjustment of compensation. 
Empirically, it turns out  that RS1t  and RS.t-l each affect the change in 
compensation. 
The accounting-based  rate of return,  denoted by RAit, is the real earnings 
yield: the ratio of bank i's real earnings per share during year t to the real 
price per share at the end of year t -  1. Aside from the use of accounting 
data, the real earnings yield is comparable in dimension to the market- 
based real rate of return, RS1t.  Unlike RSit, RAit is highly positively cor- 
related from year to year: a regression for 1983-87 (390 observations) of 
RA1t  on RA-t_1  yields the estimated coefficient 1.09, SE =  .06. (The mean 
of RA1t  for this sample is .113.) Therefore, the first difference of the ac- 
counting-based returns, ARAZt  = RAIt  -  RAI-t1,  approximates the news in 
this  series. 
We initially neglect the role of CEO experience and use the variables 
RS1t,  RS.t-1,  and ARAZt  as empirical counterparts of PERFZt.  For 330 ob- 
servations on continuing CEOs over 1983-87, a regression for the growth 
rate of real compensation is6 
log(wit/witi)  =  .079  +  .080  *  RSIt  +  .094  *  RSIt1 
(.012)  (.031)  (.029) 
+  .47  *  ARAIt,  (6) 
(.10) 
N  =  330,  R2=  .146,  u = .164. 
Thus the estimated coefficients of RS.t, RSIt  1, and ARAt are each signifi- 
cantly positive. If the lagged value of the change in the accounting return, 
ARAit1, is added to equation (6),  the estimated coefficient is insignificant: 
-.21,  SE =  .18, and the rest of the results change little. If the current and 
lagged levels of the accounting returns are included separately, instead of 
as a first difference, the estimated coefficients are .51, SE =  .11, for RA1t 
and -.29,  SE = .19, for RAit-l  . This result is consistent with the specification 
that accounting returns enter as the first difference, ARAZt,  as in equation 
(6).  (The test statistic for this restriction is t325  1.2.) 
Since the coefficients of RS1t  and RS-t_1  in equation (6) are nearly equal, 
the 2-year average  real rate  of return  to shareholders  is a satisfactory  measure 
6 Although  eq. (6) could be estimated  jointly  with eq. (5), there  would be no 
gain  over  the  separate  estimation  unless  the  error  terms  were  substantially  correlated. Bank  CEOs  457 
of market-based  performance. Defining RS2j,  to be the average of RSj,  and 
RSit-1, the regression becomes 
log (w-t/wit) I  .079  +  .174  *  RS2j, +  .46  *  ARAit, 
(.012)  (.039)  (.10)  (7) 
N=  330,  R2=  .146,  a = .164. 
In this form, the t-values for the estimated coefficients of RS2jt  and ARAt 
are 4.5 and 4.8, respectively. (The test statistic associated with equality of 
the coefficients on RSit  and RS1  is t326  0.3  .)7 
The serial correlation of the residuals from equation (7) is negative but 
insignificantly  different  from zero. For example, a regression  of the residuals 
at date t on those at date t -  1 (231 observations) yields the estimated 
coefficient -.088,  SE =  .061. Similarly, if the first lag of the dependent 
variable is added to equation (7),  the estimated coefficient (231 observa- 
tions) is negative but insignificantly different from zero: -.079,  SE = .059. 
The relation estimated in equation (7) is stable over time for the sample 
period  1983-87.  In particular, year dummies are jointly insignificant if 
added to the equation. 
Although the level of real pay in the initial year relates to the level of 
real assets in equation (5),  the growth rate of real assets turns out not to 
be a performance variable that is significantly related to the growth rate 
of  real pay. If the variable log(Ait/Ait-1)  is added to equation (7),  the 
results are 
log(wit/wit_1)  =  .074  +  .168  *  RS2jt  +  .46  *  ARAit 
(.014)  (.039)  (.10) 
+  .066  *  log(Ait/Ait-1),  (8) 
(.065) 
N=  330,  R2=  .149,  ca=  .164. 
The estimated coefficient of log(Ajt/A-t_1) is positive but insignificantly 
different from zero (t-value =  1.0). 
'The relation  between  growth  in compensation  and  performance  shown  in eqq. 
(6) and (7) is consistent  in a general  way with Murphy's  (1985) findings  for 461 
executives  in 72 manufacturing  corporations.  His results  for salary  and  bonus  (app. 
table  9) indicate  an estimated  coefficient  on the contemporaneous  stock return  of 
.086,  SE = .009.  He also reports  a significant  coefficient  on the growth  rate  of real 
sales:  .255,  SE  = .023.  We  found  (see below)  that  an  analogous  variable  for  banks- 
growth  rate  of real  assets-was insignificant  once we held fixed  the change  in the 
accounting  return,  ARAjt,  and  the lagged  stock return,  which  is included  in RS2it. 458  Barro/Barro 
Since the sample means (for the 330 observations used in eq. [7])  of 
RS2j,  and ARAsi  are .176 and -.035,  respectively, equation (7) implies that 
real compensation for continuing CEOs grew on average  by 9.4% per year 
(which is the sample mean of log(wjt/wji_)-see  App. table Al).  From 
the standpoint of marginal productivity theory, this average growth rate 
reflects the effects on productivity from greater CEO experience and also 
from advances in the overall industry and economy. 
Since the sample standard deviation of RS2-t is .24, the coefficient of 
.174 in equation (7) means that a one-standard-deviation move in stock- 
holders' returns generates a shift in the annual growth rate of real com- 
pensation by 4.1 percentage points-almost  half of the sample mean of 
log(wit/witi1).  With a standard  deviation for ARAit  of .097, a one-standard- 
deviation change in this variable  has a similar  quantitative  effect on log(wit/ 
wit-1). Thus, executive compensation is highly sensitive to performance. 
Effects  of CEO  Experience 
The theoretical discussion implied that the response of compensation 
to performance diminishes in magnitude as experience increases. Among 
the 330 observations on continuing CEOs, the median years of prior ex- 
perience as CEO, denoted EXPERit,  is 4, and the mean is 6.0 with a standard 
deviation of 4.6. (Note  that continuing CEOs must have at least 1 year of 
experience.)  For the full sample of 495 observations-which  includes newly 
hired CEOs  as well  as cases with  missing data on other variables-the 
median of  EXPER.-  is also 4, and the mean is 5.4 with a standard  deviation 
of 4.7. Figure 1 provides a histogram for the number of observations with 
each value of EXPER t  K 
We first separated the two performance variables from equation (7) 
RS2-t  and ARAit-into  observations with EXPERit below and above the 
median, that is, with EXPER-t <  4 and EXPERit 2  5, respectively. The 
results for compensation growth are then 
log(wit/wit-1)  =  .083  +  .212  *  RS2-t(EXPERi,  <  4) 
(.012)  (.043) 
+  .105  * RS2jt(EXPER*t  2  5) +  .93  *  ARAit(EXPERit  <  4) 
(.060)  (.16)  (9) 
+  .29  .ARAit(EXPER-t  2  5), 
(.11) 
N=  330,  R2 = .181,  o=  .161. 0 
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As predicted, the change in compensation is more sensitive to performance 
at lower levels of experience.8  A joint test of the hypothesis that the coef- 
ficients of each performance variable are the same over the two ranges of 
experience leads to the statistic F'325  =  7.0, which exceeds the 1% critical 
value of 4.7. The evidence that the sensitivity attenuates with experience 
is clearer for accounting-based performance than for market-based per- 
formance. For the variable ARA&t  alone, the hypothesis of equality of the 
coefficients over the two ranges of experience corresponds to the statistic 
t325  =  3.4, which is significant at less than the 1% level. For the variable 
RS2it alone, the corresponding statistic is t325 =  1.7. This statistic is sig- 
nificant at the 5% level for a one-sided test (coefficient with EXPERit  ?  4 
greater than that with EXPERit  2  5). 
The  nonlinear  functional  form  implied  by  the  theory  in  equation 
(4)  involves  the  interaction between  performance and the term  1/(To 
+ EXPERit), where To is the effective number of years of prior experience 
for a CEO in the initial year. We treat To as a constant to be estimated. 
When the two performance variables-RS2it and ARAit-are  entered mul- 
tiplicatively with the term 1/(To  +  EXPERit), the maximum-likelihood 
estimate of To is 2.4 years. The corresponding estimates of the other coef- 
ficients are given by 
log(wit/wit-1)  =  .088  +  .89  *  RS2it/(2.4  +  EXPERit) 
(.011)  (.17) 
+  4.22  *  ARAit/(2.4  +  EXPER1t),  (10) 
(0.67) 
N  =  330,  R2  =  .173,  G =  .161. 
The 950/o confidence interval for the estimate of To-determined  by the 
likelihood ratio and the 50/o critical value from the X2  distribution-is  (0.3, 
14). Although this interval  is wide, the estimated value of To  is significantly 
positive.9 As To becomes large (and the other coefficients adjust accord- 
8 Similarly, Murphy (1986,  table 3) finds that the growth in compensation is 
more sensitive to market-based performance for CEOs with fewer than 4.6 years 
of experience than for those with greater than 4.6 years. 
9  The standard  errors shown in eq. (10) are conditional on the point estimate To 
=  2.4. These standard errors are satisfactory for tests of the hypothesis that the 
coefficients associated with RS2j,  and ARAj,  are each zero. It is possible to compute 
the usual asymptotic standard errors for To and the other estimated coefficients 
based on linearization of the likelihood function about the maximum-likelihood 
estimates. These values are unsatisfactory because the distribution of the estimates 
is highly asymmetric, as indicated by the confidence interval for To. For example, 
the standard error calculated in the usual way for To is 2.0 (coefficient estimate Bank CEOs  461 
ingly),  the effect of EXPER-t  in the form of equation (10)  becomes un- 
important, and the functional form approaches the linear specification 
(without  EXPERi,) of equation (7).  Therefore, To <  oo corresponds to 
the hypothesis that the sensitivity of  compensation  to performance di- 
minishes with experience.  The value of -2*  log(likelihood ratio) associated 
with this hypothesis is  10.6, which exceeds the  1%  critical value of 6.6. 
Therefore, as in the results that considered just two ranges of experience 
in equation (9),  the conclusion is that the effects of performance on com- 
pensation change attenuate with experience.10 
The effects of experience in equation (10)  can be compared with  the 
results in equation (9) by calculating the implied response of compensation 
change to performance at various levels of experience. Table 2 shows the 
response coefficients implied by equation (10) for values of EXPERi, be- 
tween  1 and 20 years. These results are essentially the continuous coun- 
terpart of the results from equation (9),  which allowed for only two cat- 
egories  of  experience. 
The growth of compensation may depend on the level of CEO expe- 
rience, as well as on the interaction between experience and performance. 
If EXPERit is added to equation (9),  its estimated coefficient is -.0027, 
SE  .0023. In equation (10),  the result is -.0017,  SE = .0021 (using the 
maximum-likelihood estimate, To = 2.2).  Hence, the estimated effects of 
EXPERi, are statistically insignificant.11  (The age of the CEO, AGEjt, is 
also insignificant in these regressions.) 
Table  2 
Implied  Response  Coefficients  for Compensation  Growth 
Response to  Response to 
EXPERi,  RS2j,  ARAS, 
I  .26  1.24 
2  .20  .96 
5  .12  .57 
10  .07  .34 
20  .04  .19 
NOTE.-The  response  coefficients  are  calculated  from  equation  (10)  at the in- 
dicated  values  of CEO experience,  EXPERi,. 
= 2.4), whereas  the confidence  interval  derived  from  direct  calculation  of the like- 
lihood ratio is (0.3,  14). 
10  As in the previous  case, the results  are clearer  for accounting  earnings  than 
for stock  returns.  For  ARAj,  alone,  the hypothesis  of irrelevance  of EXPERi,  leads 
to a value  of -2 *  log(likelihood  ratio)  of 8.7. For RS2j,  alone, the corresponding 
value  is 3.3. These  values  compare  to the 5% critical  value of 3.8. 
" In some cases,  the CEO's initial  "year"  in office represents  a period  of less 
than 12 months.  (Recall,  however,  that we classify  an individual  as CEO only if 462  Barro/Barro 
Relative  Performance  Evaluation 
We now  consider whether compensation change depends on  perfor- 
mance filtered for peer-group performance.  We measure  peer-group results 
by the averages for the year and geographical region of stock returns and 
changes in earnings  yield.12 The regional breakdown used is New England, 
New  York City,  Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, Texas/Oklahoma,  and 
West-see  table 1. There is some arbitrariness  in the selection of regions, 
but the breakdown should capture common regional disturbances. 
The sample exhibits significant variation in performance from year to 
year: over the 1983-87 period (using all available data), the F-values for 
the joint significance of year dummies are F405 =  22.8 for RS2it  and F  48 
12.6 for ARAiZ.  There is also significant variation in performance across 
regions within a year. Given year dummies, the F-values associated with 
dummies for region and year are  F375  =  5.0  for RS2i, and F355  =  5.6 
for ARAitZ 
Let RS2  and ARA* be the regional averages applicable to bank i in 
year t.  (These averages use all available data and are not limited to the 
sample of banks included in the regressions.) If these regional averages are 
added to equation (7),  the results are 
log(wit/wit,_)  =  .072  +  .146  *RS2it  +  .45  *ARAit 
(.018)  (.050)  (.12) 
?  .071  *  RS24*  +  .00  *A  RA*,  ( 
(.086)  (.20) 
N=  330,  R2=  .148,  CG= .164. 
The coefficients on regional average performance, RS2  * and ARAt,  are 
individually and jointly insignificant. Thus, the results indicate that com- 
pensation change depends on  actual performance without  modification 
for peer-group performance. 
he is the highest  paid  executive  for  the year.)  This  initial-year  effect  means  that  the 
measured  growth  rate  of compensation  from  year 1 to year  2 tends  to be higher 
than  otherwise.  A dummy  variable  for exactly 1 year  of prior  experience  as CEO 
has  the estimated  coefficient  .055,  SE = .029.  The other  results  are  similar  to those 
shown  in (9). Furthermore,  the  estimated  coefficient  of EXPERit  is still  insignificant 
if the dummy  for EXPERi,  = 1 is also included. 
12 Because  we are dealing  with a single industry,  we cannot  use industrywide 
performance  as  a filter.  Average  performance  for  the  year  is also  problematic  because 
it cannot  be distinguished  from time dummies  in an equation  for compensation 
growth.  Time dummies  are  insignificant  if added  to eqq. (7), (9), or (10). Bank CEOs  463 
One possible interpretation of equation (11) is that the regional average 
values are not very good measures of the general performance that ought 
to be filtered out of individual performance. That is, if RS2  and ARAit 
were noise, it would  not be surprising that the estimated coefficients of 
these variables would  differ insignificantly from zero. The  region-year 
dummies do have significant explanatory power for the measures of per- 
formance; that is, there are significant common influences on banks within 
regions and years. Also, results reported later show that the probability of 
CEO turnover relates significantly to the regional average  of stock returns, 
RS2 *,  given the actual returns. Hence,  these results indicate that RS2i, 
does provide useful information. 
Equation ( 11  ) can be rewritten as a function of relative performance, 
RS-'.t-RS2  and ARA  t-ARA*,  and the  regional  average  values  to  get 
log(wjt/w-t_  )=  .072  +  .146  *(RS2 t-RS2*)  +  .217  *RS2* 
(.018)  (.050)  (.070)  (12) 
?  .45  *  (ARA  -ARA)  +  .45  *  ARA. 
(.12)  (.16) 
It is clear from equation (12) that the results cannot reject a model where 
relative and aggregate performance each matter for compensation growth. 
From this perspective, it just happens that the coefficients of relative and 
general performance do not differ significantly so that the restricted form 
where only actual performance matters-equation  (7)-is  not rejected by 
the data. 
The significance of the regional average values in equation (12) means 
that the data reject a restricted form in which only relative performance 
counts. The joint hypothesis for the significance of the two regional average 
values in equation (12) corresponds  to the statistic F2325  =  17.7. As discussed 
before, the hypothesis that only relative performance matters arises if con- 
tractual  arrangements  fully shield CEO compensation from risks associated 
with variations in aggregate performance.13  It is this proposition that is 
rejected by the data.  14 
1  The hypothesis  that only PERF  -  PERF*  matters  also requires  enough  data 
for  each  region  so that  the average  value  PERF  * measures  the aggregate  disturbance 
with  negligible  error-see Holmstrom  (1982).  More  generally,  relative  performance 
evaluation  implies that PERF  and PERF  * enter separately  with coefficients  of 
opposite  sign but not necessarily  of equal  magnitude. 
14  This finding  is consistent  with cross-industry  results  of Murphy  (1985, table 
8) and  Jensen  and  Murphy  ( 1988,  table  2). Antle  and  Smith  ( 1986,  tables  4 and  5) 
find  some  evidence  that  accounting-based  performance  is filtered  for industrywide 
outcomes.  However,  they find little indication  of this filtering  for market-based 464  Barro/Barro 
As it stands, the weaker hypothesis that relative  and general performance 
matter for changes in compensation does not impose restrictions on the 
data. In particular, the theory that changes in pay correspond to changes 
in expected marginal product does not dictate the relative magnitudes of 
the effects of relative and aggregate performance in the form of equation 
(12).  We can generate testable hypotheses by reintroducing the effects of 
CEO experience. As discussed before, because the information content of 
an additional observation diminishes as the number of observations rises, 
the sensitivity of compensation change to relative performance  falls with 
experience.  However, the effects of aggregate  performance  on compensation 
do not interact with experience in this manner. That is, the information 
content of general performance has nothing to do with the experience of 
a particular bank's CEO. 
Consider the model 
log(w@i/wi--) 
=  Po +  P1  (PERFi  -  PERFZ  )/(To  +  EXPERit) 
(13) 
+  2PERF  /(T1  +  EXPERit), 
where PERFit refers to  RS2it or ARAit and PERFZ to  the year/region 
averages of these variables. The effects of relative performance diminish 
with experience if 0 <  To <  ooz,  and the effects of general performance are 
invariant  with  experience  if  To  -*o  X.  Note  that,  as  T-*  oo (and  32 
0o  correspondingly),  the  final  term  in  equation  (13)  becomes  linear 
in PERFit. 
Using RS2it  and ARAit  as measures of PERFit,  we fit equation ( 13) with 
To  unconstrained and with To unrestricted or set at infinity (in which case 
the last term is linear in PERFZ). The value for -2  *  log(likelihood  ratio) 
corresponding to the restriction on To is 4.7, which exceeds the 5% critical 
value of 3.8. Therefore, the data indicate that-holding  fixed the influence 
of relative performance as it interacts with experience-the  sensitivity of 
compensation change to aggregate  performance  diminishes with experience. 
In fact, the data are consistent with  the hypothesis that the interaction 
with experience is the same for relative and general performance-that  is, 
To =  To in equation (13).  The value of -2  .  log(likelihood  ratio) corre- 
sponding to this restriction is only 0.3. 
performance. In a recent study, Gibbons and Murphy (1989, tables 1, 2) report 
more support for the idea that individual stock  returns are filtered for overall 
market returns in the determination of changes in CEO compensation. The results 
are difficult to interpret because overall market returns matter whereas various 
definitions of industrywide returns do not-from  an informational standpoint, the 
industry returns seem to be more relevant. Bank CEOs  465 
These findings on the interaction between aggregate performance and 
experience  are  not favorable  to the theory of relative  performance  evaluation 
based on incomplete information about CEO skill. The results can, how- 
ever, be rationalized by arguing that the sensitivity of CEO productivity 
to aggregate disturbances depends on experience for reasons that do not 
involve informational considerations. Under this interpretation, the ac- 
ceptance of the hypothesis that To =  To in equation (13)  would have to 
be viewed as a coincidence. 
The  Relation  between  Compensation  and Assets 
Equation (5)  dealt with  the relation between levels of  compensation 
and assets for CEOs in their first year in office. The correlation between 
the logarithms of real compensation and real assets for this group of 60 
CEOs is .79. For CEOs who continue in office, the growth of compensation 
depends on  performance-stock  returns and accounting earnings inter- 
acting with  experience-as  discussed before. As  also noted  before (eq. 
[8]); the growth of compensation is not significantly related to the growth 
in assets, given the performance measures. Because asset growth is only 
weakly correlated  with the performance  variables,  15 the correlation  between 
the logarithms of compensation and assets tends to diminish as experience 
increases. That is, the match between the CEO's perceived talent (as re- 
flected in compensation) and the size of the bank worsens with tenure. 
Table 3 and figure 2 show  the correlation between the logarithms of 
Table 3 
Correlation between the Logarithms of Compensation 
and Assets as a Function of CEO Experience 
Number of 
EXPERi,  Observations  Correlation 
0  60  .79 
1  58  .75 
2  58  .63 
3  49  .64 
4  41  .52 
5  29  .73 
6-7  45  .88 
8-9  37  .86 
10-11  42  .79 
12-13  34  .75 
>14  42  .82 
All  495  .74 
NOTE.-The  correlation  is between  log(wi,)  and  log(Aj,)  at the  indicated  values 
of CEO experience,  EXPERi,. 
'5 For 330 continuing CEOs, the correlation of log(Aj,/Aj,_1) is .17 with RS2j, 
and .10 with ARAit. CYS 
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real compensation and real assets as a function of CEO experience.  As 
anticipated, the correlation declines from .79 at EXPERi, =  0 to  .52 at 
EXPERi, =  4, which  is the median years of experience in the sample.'7 
The correlation then rises, however, to .73 at EXPERi, =  5 and to values 
averaging .82 for EXPERi, ?  6. In other words, after worsening initially, 
the match between CEO pay (perceived talent) and bank size improves 
as experience rises above the median. 
The theory sketched at the beginning of this article, based on Rosen 
(1982), indicated why it would be beneficial to have a good match between 
CEO talent and bank size. Despite this benefit, the match deteriorates as 
experience rises because it is costly to adjust bank assets or to change the 
identity of the CEO in response to information about the CEO's talent. 
However, new information about talent is reflected quickly in executive 
pay. If compensation and assets get far out of line, the bank is motivated 
to make adjustments in assets or in the identity of the CEO. 
The nature of the adjustment of assets to performance shows up in the 
regression, 
log(Ai,/Ai,-l)  =  .077  +  .125  *  RSil-3 +  .37  *  ARAil 
(.01I0)  (.031)  (.1 1) 
+  .29  *  ARAit-2 +  .123  *log(Aitl/Ait-2)  (14) 
(.15)  (.054) 
N=  389,  R2=  .088,  i=  .147, 
where Ait is again the real assets of bank i. Although the third lag RSt-3 is 
significantly positive, as shown  in equation (14),  the earlier lags, RSit-1 
and RSit-2,  are insignificant if added to the regression.  Equation (14) shows 
that the growth of assets also relates significantly to two lags of ARA, as 
well as to the previous year's growth in assets. The general inference from 
these results is that asset growth responds to performance, but at substan- 
tially longer lags than those applicable to compensation growth. This be- 
havior helps to explain why  the logarithms of compensation and assets 
become less correlated over a range of CEO experience-0-4  years in table 
16 The horizontal  axis  in fig. 2 plots  log(EXPERi,  + 2.4), where  2.4 is the  estimate 
of To  from before.  Although  this specification  provides  a good illustration  of the 
data,  we are  unsure  about  the proper  functional  form  for the relation  between  the 
correlation  and  experience. 
17 As mentioned  in n. 11 above,  the initial  year in office corresponds  in some 
cases  to less than 12 months.  Variations  in the number  of months  tends  to worsen 
the correlation  between  measured  annual  pay and assets.  Nevertheless,  the corre- 
lation  in the first  year  exceeds  that  in the second  year. 468  Barro/Barro 
3 and figure 2-in  which compensation adjusts more readily than assets 
to performance. The eventual adjustment of assets to performance tends, 
however, to raise the correlation  between compensation and assets at higher 
levels of experience. 
The other element that influences the correlation between compensation 
and assets is the selection of the sample as experience rises. In particular, 
when performance is especially bad-so  that compensation becomes un- 
usually low in relation to assets-the  CEO is likely to be dismissed. This 
truncation of the sample tends to raise the correlation between compen- 
sation and assets among the CEOs that remain. To allow for this effect, 
we now consider CEO turnover. 
CEO  Turnover 
If relative performance is weak and the perceived skill of the CEO is 
therefore less than expected initially, the bank may discharge the CEO 
instead of lowering pay or allowing assets to decline to match the level of 
skill. Dismissal avoids the costs of having a poor match between CEO 
skill and bank size or the costs of shrinking the bank, but it introduces 
costs associated  with CEO turnover.  These costs include the loss of specific 
capital associated with the incumbent CEO. 
Given observed performance for T years, the bank directors estimate 
the CEO's skill to be E(ki) I  T as in the model that led to equation (4).  The 
CEO is dismissed if E(ki) I  T falls below a critical value, which depends on 
T and the other parameters of  the model.  Other things being equal, a 
higher critical value is more likely to result in CEO dismissal. Since the 
variance of E(ki) I  T about the true value ki declines with T-that  is, with 
more information-the  critical value for dismissal tends to rise with T. A 
high critical value for CEOs with little experience is undesirable because 
it results in a high frequency of CEO turnover and hence in high adjust- 
ment costs. 
Recall that the sensitivity of E(ki) I  T to relative performance declines 
with T; this result implies that the responsiveness of CEO pay to relative 
performance diminishes with experience. However, since the critical value 
of E(ki) I  T for dismissal rises with  T, the net effect of experience on the 
linkage between CEO  turnover and relative performance is ambiguous. 
Unlike the case of compensation change, the theory does not imply that 
the sensitivity of turnover to performance declines with experience. 
The other aspect of CEO turnover  that differs  from compensation change 
concerns aggregate  performance  variables.  Aggregate  disturbances  can affect 
values of  marginal products of  individual CEOs  and thereby influence 
CEO compensation. In contrast,  for banks that stay in business,  the decision 
to dismiss a CEO is based on the desire to replace the existing head with 
someone else. Hence the probability of termination depends on relative 
performance and not on aggregate performance. Therefore, although pure Bank  CEOs  469 
relative  performance  evaluation  was rejected  for the growth of compen- 
sation,  it is interesting  to reexamine  this hypothesis  in the context  of CEO 
dismissal. 
Table 4 shows logit regressions  for CEO turnover.'8  The dependent 
variable  equals  one if the CEO is present  in year  t -  1 but not in year  t 
and equals  zero if the CEO is in office in both years.  The data do not 
allow us to condition departure  on "reasons"  such as death or illness, 
fires  versus  quits,  and  so on. The right  side of the equation  takes  the form 
exp(a + bx1t)/[l + exp(a + bxit)], where  xi, is a vector of explanatory 
variables. 
Three regressors  capture  the effects of the CEO's age. The variable 
AGEi,_,  is the age of the CEO in year  t -  1-that  is, in the final  year in 
office for departing  CEOs. The data come from proxy statements  that 
typically  indicate  the CEO's age in February  or March  of year  t. We took 
these numbers  as measures  of AGEit_-,  that is, as the age attained  by the 
end of the previous  year.  The variable  AGESQI-tl-the square  of AGEit- 
allows for additional  curvature  in the relation  between  probability  of de- 
parture  and age. 
For many CEOs, 65 is viewed as the "normal"  retirement  age. Given 
the nature  of the data,  this normal  behavior  could correspond  to AGE-tj 
falling  in a range  from 63 to 66. That  is, a CEO with AGEit-1  = 63 could 
be 64 during  most of the final  year  in office, and one with AGEj,_1  = 66 
could be 65 during  most of the final  year.  Hence we included  the dummy 
variable DUM6366, which equals one if AGEi,_1  is between 63 and 66 and 
zero otherwise. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the numbers of departing and continuing CEOs, 
respectively, at various ages (AGEit-1). For departing CEOs (N  =  51), 
the mean age is 60.1 (SD  =  6.5),  and the median is 63; for continuing 
CEOs  (N  =  407),  the mean is 55.4 (SD  =  5.7),  and the median is 56. 
Among the 51 departing CEOs,19  27 had ages between 63 and 66. 
The other explanatory variables are the performance measures used be- 
fore. Column  1 of table 4 includes, aside from the age variables, only the 
2-year average stock return measured relative to the region/year  average, 
RS2it  -  RS2  *. The estimated coefficient of this performance  variable  (-7.2, 
SE =  1.5) is negative and significant-meaning  that better relative perfor- 
mance as measured by the stock market reduces the probability of CEO 
turnover. We consider the effects of performance further below. 
Each of the three age variables are statistically significant. The estimated 
18 The  results  are  essentially  the same  with a probit  formulation.  Previous  studies 
that fit logit models for CEO turnover  include  Coughlan  and Schmidt  (1985), 
Warner,  Watts,  and Wruck  (1988), and  Weisbach  (1988). 
19 This  number  differs  from  the 60 new CEOs in the sample  because  of missing 
data  on AGEI-t-  or on other  variables  that  enter  into the logit regressions. I'D 
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coefficients (col.  1 of table 4) of -.91  (SE =  .32) on AGEi,_1 and .0087 
(SE =  .0029) on AGESQi,_1  imply that the probability of departure falls 
with age for AGEj,_1  <  52, and rises with age beyond that. The estimated 
coefficient on DUM6366  of  1.87 (SE =  .47) means that, given the other 
effects of age, there is an especially high probability of departure at the 
normal retirement ages between 63 and 66. 
The solid line in figure 5 shows the estimated probability of CEO de- 
parture  as a function of age for a CEO with average stock-market perfor- 
mance (RS2i, -  RS2 * = 0). The estimated values come from the regression 
shown in column 1 of table 4. The dotted line in the figure is the frequency 
of departures  found in the sample at the various ages. Note, however, that 
the numbers of observations are small at the extremes of young and high 
ages. The frequency shown  in the figure is a 3-year moving average of 
observed values (number of CEOs departing relative to the total number 
in the age group) for ages between 41 and 65. The value shown for 66 is 
for that age only, and the constant value shown for 67-71  is the average 
of values over that entire interval (consisting of two observations each for 
69, 70, and 71, and zero for 67 and 68).  The dramatic rise in departure 
probability around age 63 is clear in the data. Whether there is a fall in 
the probability after age 66 (and then a subsequent rise with age) is unclear 
because of the small number of observations in that interval. A dummy 
variable  for AGEjt_1  2  67 is, however, insignificant  if added to the regression 
in column 1 of table 4 (estimated coefficient of 0.3, SE =  1.7). 
We tested the hypothesis that the coefficients of AGEIt_-, AGESQIt-1, 
and RS2jt-RS2  were the same over the age range 63-66  as for all other 
ages. (Given the small number of observations, it does not matter which 
group  contains  the  values  with  ages  above  66.)  The  test  statistic  is 
-2*  log(likelihood  ratio) = 4.2, which is less than the 5% critical value of 
7.8. Therefore, a different intercept (the variable DUM6366)  is sufficient 
to account for the differing behavior around the normal retirement age of 
65. In particular,  the estimated coefficient of RS2t -  RS2  is significantly 
negative when estimated only over the subsample of CEOs aged between 
63 and 66 (59  observations, of which  27 are of  CEO  departures). The 
estimated coefficient for this subsample is  -7.3,  SE =  3.2. Thus, even 
around age 65, CEOs who perform better are significantly less likely to 
depart.20 
Consider now further aspects of the relation between CEO departure 
and performance.  Table 5 shows the nature  of the relation  between turnover 
frequency and relative stock returns in the underlying data. The table re- 
20 Coughlan and Schmidt (1985, table 6) find a significantly negative effect of 
abnormal stock returns on the probability of CEO departure  for CEOs aged < 63, 
but not for older CEOs.  Similarly, Weisbach (1988,  table 3) reports significant 
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Table  5 
Frequency  of CEO  Departure 
Range of AGE,,_1 
Range of RS2,-,  -  RS2,1  <  55  56-62  >  63  All 
>  .08  .020(51)  .000(49)  .100(10)  .018(110) 
(0, .08)  .018(57)  .022(45)  .333(15)  .060(117) 
(-.08,  0)  .055(55)  .106(47)  .600(20)  .164(122) 
< -.08  .118(51)  .132(38)  .550(20)  .202(109) 
All  .051(214)  .061(179)  .446(65)  .111(458) 
NOTE.-The  entry  in each  cell is the  ratio  of CEO  departures  to the  total  number  of CEO  observations. 
The number  in parentheses  is the number  of observations. 
ports the annual frequency of CEO departures  for categories of ages (<  55, 
between  56 and 62, and  >  63)  and relative returns, RS2itj  -  RS2>1 
(>  .08,  (0,  .08),  (-.08,  0),  and  <  -.08).  Since the  mean  of  RS2it.1 
-  RS2z1  is close to zero and the standard  deviation,  , is .16, the categories 
for returns are >  i/2,  (0,  i/2),  (-a/2,  0), and < -a/2.  The table shows 
a marked tendency in all age ranges for the departure frequency to rise as 
the stock return  worsens. For example, for all ages combined, the frequency 
goes from .02 for returns above  i/2  to  .06 between zero and  i/2,  .16 
between zero and -a/2,  and .20 below  i/2.  (For the entire sample, the 
average annual departure frequency is .11.) 
Column 2 of table 4 allows for separate coefficients on RSit1 -RS*> 
and RSU-2-  RS>*t2  in the logit regression. As in the case of compensation 
growth, the two estimated coefficients are nearly equal, so that the 2-year 
average variable RS2it  -  RS2  ~  -used  in column  1 of the table-is  satis- 
factory. 
Column 3 of the table adds the region-relative change in the earnings 
yield, ARAt-1 -  ARA*-,.  The estimated coefficient is negative but insig- 
nificant:  -2.0,  SE = 3.4. Thus, unlike compensation growth, the probability 
of  CEO  departure is not  significantly related to  accounting-based per- 
formance. 
Column 4 separates  the stock-market performance  into the actual return, 
RS2itj,  and the regional average  return,  RS2>*-1.  The estimated coefficients 
are opposite  in sign and of similar magnitude: -7.5  (1.6)  and 6.1 (1.9), 
respectively. A test of the pure relative performance hypothesis-that  the 
coefficients are of equal magnitude but opposite in sign-leads  to the value 
of -2  l  log(likelihood  ratio) of  1.0, which  is well  below  the 5% critical 
value of 3.8. Thus, pure relative performance evaluation is accepted here.2' 
21 Warner et al. (1988, table 5) report a logit regression for the probability of 
CEO change. They find that the coefficient of the contemporaneous own  stock 
return is negative and that of the market return is positive and of  comparable 
magnitude. The results involving lagged returns are less clear. They do not provide 
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The acceptance of the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation for 
the probability of CEO departure contrasts with the results for compen- 
sation growth. Thus,  the indication is that CEO  turnover depends on 
relative performance, whereas compensation growth depends on relative 
and aggregate performance. These results are consistent with the theory 
in which  compensation  growth corresponds to  the change in expected 
marginal  product, but turnover involves a comparison of the existing CEO 
with alternative executives. 
Column 6 of table 4 shows that an additional lag of the stock-return 
variable, RS-_  -  RS2  *-3,  is insignificant. Hence  the main response of 
CEO turnover to market-based performance occurs over a 2-year period. 
Column  7 adds another lag of accounting-based performance. The esti- 
mated coefficient of ARAU-2  -  ARA,*2 is negative but insignificant: -7.7, 
SE =  5.2. The introduction of this second lag raises the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient  of  the  first lag, ARA--,  -  ARA*2,  to-4.5,  SE 
=  4.0. The two lags of accounting-based  relative  performance  are, however, 
jointly insignificant: the value of -2  log(likelihood  ratio) is 2.6, which is 
below the 5% critical value of 6.0. Hence the conclusion again is that the 
probability of CEO turnover does not relate significantly to accounting- 
based performance.22 
Our finding is that market- and accounting-based performances  are each 
important for compensation growth, whereas only the market-based  mea- 
sure is significant for turnover probability. A possible explanation involves 
the idea of Gibbons and Murphy (1988) that accounting earnings  are prone 
to manipulation by the CEO in the short run. For CEOs who  are close 
to the margin of being dismissed-because  they have performed badly- 
the horizon is short, and the incentive to manipulate the accounting num- 
bers is great. For this reason, a decision to terminate the CEO gives little 
weight to accounting earnings and relies instead on stock returns or other 
data that are relatively immune from manipulation. 
Column 8 of table 4 divides RS1t  -  RS>1  into ranges in which CEO 
experience is below or above the median (EXPERit c  4 and 2  5, respec- 
tively). The estimated  coefficients in the two ranges  are  very close; therefore 
the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the sensitivity of turnover 
to performance is independent of experience. (The test statistic is 0.1 with 
a 5% critical value of 3.8.) This result on experience is another contrast 
with the findings for compensation growth; in that case theoretical rea- 
soning and empirical evidence showed that compensation change was more 
sensitive to performance at lower levels of experience. For CEO turnover, 
and Murphy (1989,  table 6)  report results that are similar to  those  of  Warner 
et al. 
22 In contrast, Weisbach ( 1988, table 5) reports a significantly negative relation 
between the probability of CEO  turnover and changes in accounting earnings, 
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the theoretical  effect  of experience  is ambiguous,  and the empirical  effect 
turns  out to be indistinguishable  from  zero. 
It is possible  that  CEO turnover  reflects  mismatches  in either  direction- 
the CEO is either too bad or too good for the bank-rather than poor 
performance,  per se. If mismatches  in either  direction  are important,  the 
probability  of CEO departure  would rise with the magnitude  of relative 
performance.  We added the absolute  value of RS2-t_1  -  RS2>*-  to the 
regression  in column  1 of table  4. The estimated  coefficient  of this  absolute 
value  has  the "wrong"  sign and  differs  insignificantly  from  zero:  -3.4 (SE 
=  3.4), whereas  that of the algebraic  value, RS2it_1  -  RS2>*t1,  remains 
significantly  negative:  -9.2 (SE = 2.7). Thus  the results  indicate  that  CEOs 
who perform  much better  than expected  are especially  likely to remain 
with the bank,  rather  than  tending  to move to another  (larger)  bank  that 
is a better  match for their unexpectedly  high skill. One reason  that this 
type of move tends not to occur is that the match  between  CEO talent 
and bank size can be improved  by expanding  the size of the bank,  as in 
equation  (14). 
Given the results shown in table 4, the main effects of performance on 
the probability of CEO turnover are captured by the logit regression in 
column 1, which includes RS2it1 -RS2>*_1  as the only performance vari- 
able. To evaluate the performance effects quantitatively, note that the logit 
form implies that the derivative  of the logarithm  of the departure  probability 
with respect to the relative  stock return  is 13(1  -p),  where 1 is the regression 
coefficient (-7.2)  and p is the probability of departure.23  For example, if 
RS2it_ -RS2>it-  =  0, the derivative at age 55 is -7.0,  which means that 
an increase by .01 in the stock return reduces the departure  probability by 
7%/from  .033 to .031. At age 65, the derivative is -4.0,  so that an increase 
by .01 in the return lowers the probability by 4%/from  .45 to .43. 
Table 6 shows the estimated probability of departure  (based on the logit 
regression in col. 1 of table 4)  at ages 50, 60, and 65 and for relative stock 
returns  between .32 and -.32.  Since the sample standard  deviation of RS2-ti 
-  RS2>1 is .16, the range for relative returns is a two-standard-error  band 
about the mean. The estimated values in table 6 are basically the fitted 
values corresponding to the observed frequencies of departures that were 
shown before in table 5. 
Summary  of Major Findings  and Conclusions 
We studied compensation for bank CEOs by examining the match be- 
tween levels of pay and bank size for newly hired chief executives. The 
elasticity of about one-third for compensation in relation to assets is in 
line with  previous estimates for other industries and time periods. For 
CEOs who continue in office, the growth of compensation varies positively 
23 This result  follows from the formula  p = exp(a + Pr)/[I  + exp(a + Pr)], 
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Table  6 
Estimated  Probability  of CEO  Departure 
AGEIt-1 
RS2jIj -  RS2i*-  50  60  65 
.32  .003  .005  .075 
.24  .006  .009  .126 
.16  .011  .016  .205 
.08  .019  .029  .315 
.00  .033  .050  .450 
-.08  .057  .086  .594 
-.16  .097  .144  .723 
-.24  .161  .230  .823 
-.32  .255  .348  .892 
NOTE.-Each entry shows the  estimated probability  of 
CEO departure  at the indicated  values  of AGEj,_,  and RS2j,_j 
-  RS2LI  , based  on the logit regression  in column  I of table  4. 
The  range  of values  shown  for  RS2j,, -  RS21 is a two-standard- 
error  band  about  the mean  of zero. 
with performance  measures  based on stock returns  and accounting earnings. 
The sensitivity of compensation change to performance declines signifi- 
cantly as CEO experience increases. We interpreted this effect in terms of 
the  declining  information  content  of  additional  observations on  per- 
formance. 
There is no indication that individual bank performance is filtered for 
regional average performance in the relation with compensation growth; 
in particular,  the data reject the hypothesis that only relative performance 
affects the change in compensation. The results are consistent with a theory 
in which the growth in pay equals the growth in expected marginal  product; 
in this case, CEO pay responds to relative and aggregate performance. In 
contrast, the findings are inconsistent with  the existence of  agreements 
that fully shield CEO compensation from aggregate risks. 
Since compensation growth reacts to stock returns  and accounting earn- 
ings, but not to  growth  in assets, the correlation between the levels of 
compensation and assets-which  reflects the match between the quality 
of the CEO and the size of the organization-tends  to worsen as tenure 
increases. Empirically, this correlation declines as experience rises from 0 
to 4 years (the sample median) but subsequently increases to a level com- 
parable  to that for new CEOs. One mechanism that raises the correlation 
at higher levels of  experience is the lagged response of  bank assets to 
performance. Another element is the truncation of the sample, via CEO 
departure,  to eliminate the executives whose performance  is especially bad. 
We estimated logit regressions  to relate  the probability  of CEO departure 
to age and performance. The probability of departure rises with age (for 
ages above the early 50s)  and becomes particularly high in the normal 
retirement span around age 65. Even around age 65, the probability of 
departure  declines significantly with better performance. 480  Barro/Barro 
The main findings for the relation between CEO turnover and perfor- 
mance are that, first, the departure  probability falls significantly with stock 
returns  but not with accounting earnings;  second, the effects of stock returns 
enter relative to regional average returns; and third, the sensitivity of de- 
parture probability to stock returns does not vary significantly with CEO 
experience. The potential for manipulation of the accounting results may 
explain why  accounting-based performance is unimportant for turnover 
but is significant for compensation growth (CEOs  who  are close to the 
margin of termination have short horizons and are therefore more likely 
to engage in earnings manipulation). The success of relative performance 
evaluation in the context of CEO turnover accords with a model in which 
dismissal involves a comparison of the incumbent with alternative chief 
executives. This model is also consistent with the result that the sensitivity 
of CEO departure to performance does not vary systematically with ex- 
perience. 
Appendix 
Table  Al 
Means and  Standard  Deviations  of  Variables 
Sample of  Sample for Logit Regressions 
Sample of  Continuing 
New  CEOs  CEOs  All  Depart  Stay 
(N=  60)  (N=  330)  (N  =  458)  (N=  51)  (N  =  407) 
Wit  .430(.198)  .497(.197)  . .  .  . ..  ... 
Dwit  . ..  .094(.177)  . ..  . ..  .. 
Ait  19.6(34.0)  15.4(22.8)  . . .  . . .... 
DAit  ...  .101(.140)  ...  ...  ... 
RSit-  . . .  .134(.332)  .193(.300)  .067(.307)  .208(.295) 
RSit -  RS  a  .  .002(.255)  .010(.165)  -.083(.115)  .022(.167) 
RA  _  a  . ..  .121(.106)  .1 58(.083)b  .1  41(.163)r  .1 60(.066) d 
ARAta  .  ..  -.035(.097)  -.019(.071)  b  -.029(.125)c  -.018(.061)d 
ARA,, -  ARA,  a  ...  .002(.075)  -.002(.053)b  -.008(.070)c  -.002(.05)d 
EXPERt  0  6.0(4.6)  ...  ... 
AGEita  52.9(6.6)  56.5(5.7)  55.9(6.0)  60.1(6.5)  55.4(5.7) 
NOTE.-Standard  deviations are shown  in parentheses. The logit sample refers to the regressions in 
table 4. The total of 458 observations breaks down into  51 CEOs who  depart and 407 who  stay. The 
symbol D on a variable denotes the growth rate from t  -  1 to t; w is real compensation in millions, A is 
real assets in billions, RS is the real rate of return on stocks, RA is the real earnings yield, ARA is the 
change in RA from t  -  1 to t, EXPER is prior years as CEO, and AGE is the age indicated on the next 
proxy statement (usually February or March). 
a  Values for the logit sample refer to year t  -  1. 
bN  = 446. 
'N=  50. 
dN  = 396. 
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